WEBVTT

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JIM: Hello, Jack.

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JACK: Hello, hello.

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JIM: Good — well, it’s ‘good evening’ for me. I guess you’re in the states,

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so it’s probably the afternoon.

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JACK: Yeah, yeah, I just ate lunch. I’m having some chocolate. You like chocolate?

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JIM: Oh, yes. [Inaudible]. There’s very — well,

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there’s very few people, I think, don’t like chocolate, but — yeah.

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JACK: I know. Yeah, chocolate’s great.

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JIM: Yeah, yeah. Keeps you going, a bit of energy…

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JACK: Yeah, a little caffeine hit.

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JIM: Indeed.

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JACK: You know, there’s only a few places in the world that have caffeine. There’s tea,

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coffee, cola, chocolate, and I think that’s it. That’s the natural sources.

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JIM: Yeah. No, it’s — yeah, it’s hard to do without it,

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yeah. I do like a bit of chocolate. You’re actually making me hungry. I

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probably got you at a bad time. I wasn’t actually expecting you to say, yeah,

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I’m ready to go and we can just do this, but it absolutely suits me down to the ground, so…

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JACK: You know what? The thing is is that you are the most requested guest maybe I’ve ever had.

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JIM: Well, okay. That’s amazing.

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JACK: So, if you’re available, I’m available. Let’s go. I’m gonna put

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the chocolate to the side, and let’s get — let’s make a podcast.

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JIM: Yeah, that’s cool. I’ve gotta say even before we do this, I have listened to loads

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of your podcasts and honestly, it’s an honor for me even to be asked onto it. So, there you go.

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JACK: So, you’re the guy that everyone knows, and you’re ready to go?

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JIM: Oh, I’m ready, yeah, yeah. Fire away.

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(INTRO): [INTRO MUSIC] These are true stories from the dark side of

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the internet. I’m Jack Rhysider. This is Darknet Diaries. [INTRO MUSIC ENDS]

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JACK: Today I have the absolute pleasure to speak with Jim Browning. Jim was the first

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person I ever saw do scambaiting, and I was blown away that someone even does

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this sort of thing. Scambaiting is just as it sounds; he tries to bait scammers to scam him,

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and he records it for YouTube, and it’s really quite amazing to watch.

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JIM: [MUSIC] So, it still says ‘connecting’.

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SCAMMER1: [Inaudible] taking a long time because I…

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JIM: Yeah, I don’t know why.

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SCAMMER1: …your computer and internet is working really [inaudible] because

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it got infected with the virus. [CROSSTALK] So, let me explain…

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JIM: Oh, is it the virus doing this? Alright.

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SCAMMER1: Yes.

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JIM: Nothing to do with the livestream, then.

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SCAMMER1: Let me explain to you now what happened, actually. The alert which you got,

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that is that security block alert which is coming from internet, because right now you

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have no — any internet security. That is the reason, while browsing over the internet by

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mistake or by accidentally. You might have — click any link which was not secure, okay?

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JIM: Oh, I see.

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JACK: How did all this get started for you? What’s your origin story with this whole scam thing?

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JIM: [MUSIC] Well, I wish it was a bit more like Batman, you know? Batman has

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got this — an injustice [inaudible] and they — he’s after the Joker and all this. Very,

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very different for me. The way I got started was probably like most people; I receive lots of scam

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phone calls. You keep hearing those incessant phone calls, people pretending to be Microsoft,

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pretending they’re Amazon, your bank, and so on. Most people know just to hang up those calls,

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but I am one of those people who — I love to dig a little bit deeper because I am

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an engineer. I know about computers, know about networks, and I thought to myself,

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surely someone is doing something about this, and if they’re not, maybe I can do something.

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JACK: I’m sure you’re familiar with the fake Microsoft support scam calls. It’s

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typically where someone from India calls you up and says you have a

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problem with your computer, and it sounds something like this.

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JIM: [PHONE RINGING] Hi, hello?

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SCAMMER2: Oh, yes. Hello. I’m calling from We Support [inaudible] and my name is Sandeep, Jim.

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JACK: They’ll try to convince you that your computer has a virus and they can help,

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and they’ll ask for control of your computer to fix it. But the thing is, you don’t actually

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have a virus at all. They just made up this problem and they want to take your money. Jim

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finds this whole thing really fascinating and just can’t stop thinking about this.

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JIM: I really want to find out about what makes the scam tick.

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JACK: So, Jim finds himself on these calls to hear how it works and watch

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their whole operation, and then he calls them out on it like this.

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SCAMMER2: Yes, I just need to inform you that we have finished

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all the work with the computer now and everything is working fine with it.

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JIM: Right. Did you find any Trojans or anything?

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SCAMMER2: Yes. We have already removed all your network infections,

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and also we have blocked them so they will not enter from now onwards.

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JIM: Right. Just that I was watching everything you were doing and also recording what you’re

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doing and recording your voice, because you’ve removed nothing whatsoever from

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this machine. It was never infected in the first place and all you’ve done…

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SCAMMER2: I’m sorry?

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JIM: It was never infected with anything in the first place, and you know that. So, you say

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that you’ve removed a Trojan. Tell me what Trojan you’ve removed and show me evidence of that, then.

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SCAMMER2: Alright. Now, we have already removed — and

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everything is recorded at our end as well. Yes?

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JIM: Yeah, show me. Tell me what Trojan I had, then.

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SCAMMER2: We have removed all the Trojans.

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JIM: Yeah, show me. Show me one Trojan that you’ve removed.

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SCAMMER2: Okay, let me explain it to you. There were Trojan horses in it.

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JIM: Yeah, show me evidence of that. That’s what I’m asking.

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SCAMMER2: But how should I show you now? But they are already removed.

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JIM: Because if it was something like, oh, this particular tool, it would have logs and it would

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show you in the history what was removed, okay? There’s nothing been removed here.

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SCAMMER2: This is an anti-malware software.

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JIM: So, go on then. Tell me what software you used to remove any Trojan. Bear in mind,

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I’ve recorded everything you’ve done. So,

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are you gonna still stand by that story that you removed a Trojan?

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SCAMMER2: So, may I put the line on hold for one to two minutes?

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JIM: You can do what you want, but don’t forget; all of this is going to

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be uploaded to YouTube very shortly, so be very careful what you say in the next few minutes.

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JACK: Jim is pretty good at catching them in a lie, and then he tries to get

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them to explain themselves. When they continue denying it, he reports them.

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SCAMMER2: Definitely.

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JIM: What I will do is now that I’ve got your IP address, this one, and the timestamp,

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which is Mumbai — so it’s now 6:00 PM; it’s been running for a few hours, this one, though — I can

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go to your ISP, and that’s Tata Tele Services in Italy. They provide that IP address to you,

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and that’s the one you’re using at the minute. So, I’m gonna get them to identify exactly who

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you are, because I know your address isn’t in California. I know you’re located in India. Or…

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SCAMMER2: Okay…

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JIM: …I’ll probably just publish all of this on YouTube anyway. Right?

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SCAMMER2: So, thank you for choosing We Support…

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JIM: Thank you for choosing scammers in Mumbai, yes. Okay. [TO JACK] Yeah, in my — my background

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is that I have been in IT really all my professional life, all my working life.

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JACK: Yeah, let’s hear about that. What’s the specialty that you are in IT?

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JIM: Yeah, so, I guess up until very recently I had a real job,

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as in a real, normal IT job. I worked for a large company, should we say in the UK,

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and part of their specialty was dealing with IT services and setup, and I have personally

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supported an organization with more than two or three hundred people in it. So, I’m the kinda

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admin, the sysadmin, for a large IT company. So, that’s my background. As part of that,

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I am also a programmer, I’m a network engineer, and — but I have no form of qualifications in,

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for example, cybersecurity, although at this stage I think I could probably do

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fairly well in a cybersecurity exam. But my background is a normal IT job. That’s it.

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JACK: [MUSIC] A lot of times what these scammers will do is type commands on your computer to prove

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you have a virus, but all they’re doing is just showing you really normal computer activity,

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and it doesn’t prove anything. In fact, one time I saw a video of his where a scammer just typed

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on the screen that the firewall is damaged and is at 2%. The scammer was trying to say

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hackers are gonna soon break through and get everything. But the thing is is that firewalls

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don’t have a percentage, and it’s great that Jim knows a lot about IT and can easily spot

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every one of these bad attempts at showing him that there’s a problem on his computer.

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JIM: …type these things into your computer and, look, you’ve got hackers, you’ve got viruses,

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you’ve got computer problems. You’re gonna have to pay me $200, $300 to fix that problem.

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JACK: Now, these scammers are not sophisticated at all. Their scam is really basic, but their

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method of collecting payment is crazy ridiculous. What they should do is just act like a normal

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company and set up a website where you enter in your credit card details and send the money,

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but they can’t do that because payment processors will quickly spot and shut them down and freeze

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their money, maybe even charge them a fee. So, Stripe and PayPal are just out of the question

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here, which means they’ve gotta come up with some creative, alternative ways to get money from you.

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JIM: They will get you to buy a giftcard. They won’t use the word ‘giftcard’. What they say

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to their victims is you’ve got a security problem; you’re gonna have to solve it with

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a security card, and you’ll have to go to your local Walmart or whatever to get the

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security card. They won’t use the word ‘giftcard’ if they can avoid it, but of course, whenever you

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go in there and you’re outside the store, they will say, right, I need you to go in and buy an

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Apple card or an eBay card or whatever it is. As soon as you read out that number, that’s as good

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as them taking the value of that card because they can launder that almost immediately. So…

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JACK: So, I’m curious on that. How do they launder it? Because

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if you give someone an eBay card, they’re not going to buy something

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on eBay. They’re probably selling that for pennies on the dollar.

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JIM: They do, exactly, and they’d be lucky to get maybe 50% of the actual value of the card.

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But what they do is they take those numbers and there is quite a — well,

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shall we say a black market for giftcard numbers? They are legitimate websites like

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Paxful, for example, where people will buy Google Play cards, eBay cards, you name it,

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any sort of giftcard, and they will give you 50% of the value and they will mark that up,

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and they may directly or indirectly buy items from those stores. So, yes, absolutely, they’re gonna

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lose half the value, but if you’re a scammer, you have completely, cleanly washed that money because

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there’s almost no way of getting money back when someone’s bought a giftcard and it’s been used.

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JACK: This always seems surprising to me, to convince your victim to hang up the phone,

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go drive to the store, buy a giftcard, then drive back home and call the scammer back up

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to give them the giftcard details. I just think you’re gonna lose your victim every

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time in that process. On top of that, they’re only getting half the value that’s on the card.

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But this seems to be pretty effective. These scam centers are making quite a bit of money this way,

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and I guess this means that even though the scam is hilariously bad and the method of

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collecting money is ridiculously complex, the thing that makes this work is the numbers,

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the relentless attempts at scamming people. If they try over and over and over,

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they’ll eventually get people to pay them. Now, of course, some victims don’t want to send giftcards,

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so the scammers say, that’s fine. There’s another way; send us cash.

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JIM: They actually persuade people to go to their local bank and withdraw cash. They will say,

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I’ll instruct you in a moment what you do with the cash. So, they generally get the victim to take

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the cash home, and then they’ll say — and this is typically for a bank-type scam. They’ll say,

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we’re gonna create a new account for you and you need to send that money to a secure facility. They

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will say, look, you need to put the cash into pages of a book. So, between pages of a book,

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wrap that in silver foil, and they will actually get you then to go to the nearest

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FedEx or post office and mail your cash to an address, and it’s a money mule address.

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JACK: That sounds even more bizarre. Have these victims never paid for anything in their life

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before? In what world is it normal to wrap cash up in tinfoil and stuff it in a book and then ship it

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somewhere to get your computer fixed? I don’t want to be victim-blaming here, but come on,

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how colorblind to you have to be to not see these giant red flags? One of the scams that Jim

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sees often is called a refund scam, and it might start out with a phone call that sounds like this.

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SCAMMER3: [ROBOTIC VOICE] Hi. We are calling you from your computer maintenance department.

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If you remember, you have a contract with us. For computer support and services,

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unfortunately we are closing the business. So,

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you can give us a call for the refund of the amount you paid to claim your refund.

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JACK: This is a real voicemail or a phone call that somebody got, and people are

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falling for this and calling up the number. To you and me, that phone call sounds ridiculous,

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doesn’t it? Like, it’s a crappy robo voice and it’s not fooling us. But just think about the

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mechanics of this call. They’re clearly using some text-to-speech software, right? I don’t know why,

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but they’re using a terrible version and have terrible English, but technology is rapidly

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improving. There’s way better software out there today, and I just wonder, you know, some day the

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scammers are gonna upgrade and use the good stuff. Let me demonstrate. Here’s what I’m gonna do;

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I’m gonna improve this whole scam attempt. Are you ready? First, I’m gonna take the text that they

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said in that call and ask ChatGPT to rewrite this but make it sound more like a natural

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English-speaker would say. Cool. Now, take that and make it sound even more casual, like something

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you’d just hear on a phone call or something. Okay, that looks good. Now I’ll run this through

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a more modern text-to-speech software. Okay, it’s done. Let’s take a listen to this call now.

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SCAMMER3: Hello, sorry to bother you. My name is Sarah from the computer maintenance

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department. I need to talk with you about your support contract with us. Here’s the thing;

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we’re closing the business. I know, it’s a bummer. I’m sorry. But here’s the good news;

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you’ll be getting a refund for the amount you’ve already paid us. Whenever you have a moment, can

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you call me back? I want to get this refund to you as soon as possible. Hope to chat with you soon.

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JACK: You see how much better it is with modern tools? Seriously,

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that took me two minutes of just using automated tools to fix it up. The audio went from stupid…

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SCAMMER3: [ROBOTIC VOICE] …computer maintenance department…

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JACK: …to scary.

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SCAMMER3: I know, it’s a bummer.

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JACK: Maybe you can still spot that that’s AI-generated, but would your grandparents

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think that? I improved it because I want you to be aware of the tools that scammers have at

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their disposal today if they wanted to, and I want you to think about how much better their

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scams are gonna be in the future. We see that they’re using text-to-speech software today,

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and it’s just a matter of time that that text-to-speech software sounds

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really convincing. Then what? What red flags would you notice in this audio to make you

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think it’s a scam? Now you’ve really gotta think, well, hold on, do I actually have a

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support contract somewhere? Who are these people? Let me call them up and find out.

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Now you’re on a phone call with a scammer, a position you really don’t want to be in,

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and you can see how this whole thing is gonna get trickier and trickier in the future.

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JIM: [MUSIC] The scam is what you call a refund scam. So, they’ll pretend to be a

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big organization, typically Amazon, and the conversation will start off with — they say

00:17:27.240 --> 00:17:33.600
they’re gonna refund this charge, which the victim will know nothing about.

00:17:33.600 --> 00:17:38.080
JACK: Okay. If I’m the victim, I’d be like, okay,

00:17:38.080 --> 00:17:42.480
I have no memory of this charge. Go ahead, refund me, and see you later.

00:17:42.480 --> 00:17:46.660
But it’s trickier than that. Here’s one of the actual scam calls that Jim captured.

00:17:46.660 --> 00:17:50.240
SCAMMER4: We can easily send you the money into your account in five to

00:17:50.240 --> 00:17:55.800
ten minutes and you will get your amount right back right now, okay? Alright. So,

00:17:55.800 --> 00:18:00.340
do you do online banking then? So, which bank do you do online banking?

00:18:00.340 --> 00:18:03.360
JIM: This victim mentions Mid Oregon Bank.

00:18:03.360 --> 00:18:09.520
SCAMMER4: Just go ahead and log into your bank. Log into your bank first of all, sir. Alright,

00:18:09.520 --> 00:18:16.240
that’s great. Now, sir, you have to tell me — like, your account has been opened, right?

00:18:16.240 --> 00:18:22.520
Alright, sir. I do need that — you have to tell me in which account do your need your money back?

00:18:22.520 --> 00:18:26.680
JACK: Now, here’s where the scam part comes in. The scammer will say that they want to

00:18:26.680 --> 00:18:32.120
make sure the money goes into the proper bank account and will ask to see the victim’s screen

00:18:32.120 --> 00:18:37.320
by using some screen-sharing application, and then they’ll ask to take control of the victim’s

00:18:37.320 --> 00:18:43.800
computer. Once they have control of the victim’s computer and can see their online bank balances,

00:18:43.800 --> 00:18:49.160
then they’ll say they’re initiating the refund for, whatever, say $300. Since the victim is

00:18:49.160 --> 00:18:55.560
logged into the bank’s website, what the scammer will do is edit the web page in the browser to

00:18:55.560 --> 00:18:59.640
make it look like the money was just deposited into the account. But it’s a fake deposit,

00:18:59.640 --> 00:19:03.240
though. It just looks like the money went in, but the scammer just faked the whole transaction

00:19:03.240 --> 00:19:10.200
by editing the HTML on the victim’s screen. But here’s the tricky part; the scammer will put in

00:19:10.200 --> 00:19:16.800
the wrong amount for the refund. If the victim was expecting a $300 refund, the scammer would

00:19:16.800 --> 00:19:24.200
instead put in a $5,000 deposit instead, then act all surprised that they put in the wrong amount.

00:19:24.200 --> 00:19:26.600
SCAMMER4: $5,000 [inaudible], you said? Oh,

00:19:26.600 --> 00:19:28.980
my goodness. Will you please hold on for a minute, sir?

00:19:28.980 --> 00:19:33.080
JIM: So, the scammer obviously knows that he’s overpaid this victim. So,

00:19:33.080 --> 00:19:38.440
the key to this scam is how they get the money back again. Our scammer comes up with a solution.

00:19:38.440 --> 00:19:44.080
SCAMMER4: Sir, I just got a mail from a [inaudible] server, and unfortunately that you

00:19:44.080 --> 00:19:50.100
got extra amount in your account by mistake, sir. So, sir, will you please refund me my money back?

00:19:50.100 --> 00:19:52.720
JIM: Inevitably, the victim asks how you

00:19:52.720 --> 00:19:55.960
can refund the money. Surely they can just take it back themselves.

00:19:55.960 --> 00:20:00.240
SCAMMER4: Oh, sir, I can tell you — I can tell you,

00:20:00.240 --> 00:20:02.880
sir, what you have to do to refund me my money back to me,

00:20:02.880 --> 00:20:06.240
alright? Let me have a — speak with my manager, okay, sir? Let me have a word with them.

00:20:06.240 --> 00:20:08.660
JIM: A few moments later, there’s a proposal.

00:20:08.660 --> 00:20:12.920
SCAMMER4: …have a word with my manager, sir, and they said there is some financial institution

00:20:12.920 --> 00:20:18.200
where you can send our money back to us, alright? So, do you know any Apple Store near someplace?

00:20:18.200 --> 00:20:20.880
JIM: Yes, he said ‘Apple Store’. He wants his

00:20:20.880 --> 00:20:26.440
victim to go to an Apple Store in order to get his money back.

00:20:26.440 --> 00:20:30.760
SCAMMER4: You don’t know? Okay, well, let me find Apple Store for you, sir. Hold on for one minute.

00:20:30.760 --> 00:20:34.480
JIM: He searches on the victim’s PC for the nearest Apple Store.

00:20:34.480 --> 00:20:40.620
SCAMMER4: Can you see, sir? There is a place called Simplymart. Do you know this place?

00:20:40.620 --> 00:20:43.880
JIM: He spends the next few minutes explaining that he’s

00:20:43.880 --> 00:20:48.200
going to need $5,000 worth of Apple gift vouchers.

00:20:48.200 --> 00:20:54.040
JACK: Jim says he’s seen scammers also try to get people to send back the money using Zelle and bank

00:20:54.040 --> 00:20:59.880
wires, too, and some people have lost quite a bit of money to these refund scams. It really does

00:20:59.880 --> 00:21:05.400
look convincing when you look at your bank balance and it shows $5,000 more than what you were

00:21:05.400 --> 00:21:10.280
expecting. The victim could just refresh the page and the whole thing would reset, but the scammers

00:21:10.280 --> 00:21:17.720
are really good at preying on the victim’s goodwill, you know? The victims will give back

00:21:17.720 --> 00:21:24.840
the money, which is a pretty jerk thing to do, to exploit the goodness in people. [TO JIM] You

00:21:24.840 --> 00:21:30.560
said that up until recently you had a real job. Is this now your full-time job, is content creator?

00:21:30.560 --> 00:21:39.920
JIM: It is, yeah. So, as of just over a year and a bit ago, I gave up my full-time job, IT job,

00:21:39.920 --> 00:21:45.220
and my full-time job is now making YouTube videos and, yeah, going after scammers.

00:21:45.220 --> 00:21:51.600
JACK: So, it sounds like this is something you’re really passionate about, to leave your career

00:21:51.600 --> 00:21:58.920
behind, go right into chasing after scammers and exposing them. Is that true? This is your passion?

00:21:58.920 --> 00:22:04.560
JIM: Oh, for sure, yeah. It’s definitely a passion. I can’t stand scammers. That

00:22:04.560 --> 00:22:10.280
is my little tagline, if you like, of my YouTube channel. I can’t stand scammers.

00:22:10.280 --> 00:22:15.000
JACK: The thing about you, Jim, though, when I’m watching you and I’m listening to you,

00:22:15.000 --> 00:22:19.960
your voice is just so calm and cool and I never hear passion in there and

00:22:19.960 --> 00:22:23.320
I never hear things like, I can’t stand scammers. There’s not even — you don’t

00:22:23.320 --> 00:22:28.320
even have inflection when you say that. You’re just like, I can’t stand scammers.

00:22:28.320 --> 00:22:33.680
JIM: But this is the thing; I really don’t — and maybe it’s something to do with my Irish accent or

00:22:33.680 --> 00:22:41.640
whatever, but honestly, when it comes to scams and scammers, now I’m devoting my life, but it

00:22:41.640 --> 00:22:50.440
is for that reason. If you watch what I do, if you listen to the calls I hear every single day,

00:22:50.440 --> 00:22:57.320
you can’t help not going after these guys. I’ve kinda — I build up a bit of a hatred for them,

00:22:57.320 --> 00:23:03.400
but it probably doesn’t come across in the way I make the YouTube videos or my inflections or

00:23:03.400 --> 00:23:11.480
anything else. But in a lot of ways that helps me because if I appear calm, if I try to think it

00:23:11.480 --> 00:23:19.600
through, if I try to rationalize what I’m doing, it gives me, in some way, a bit of strength to

00:23:19.600 --> 00:23:24.160
try and combat these scammers, ‘cause I like to think I’ve got a level head when it comes

00:23:24.160 --> 00:23:29.680
to tracking these guys down, and I think that’s why I’ve been a success as well as I have been.

00:23:29.680 --> 00:23:35.320
JACK: Yeah, you have a unique approach that — you’re not sensationalizing it.

00:23:35.320 --> 00:23:39.680
This is what I loved about it, actually, honestly, is there’s kind of been a trend

00:23:39.680 --> 00:23:45.160
of people doing things similar to you now, and they’re making it into a big game and

00:23:45.160 --> 00:23:49.320
lots of excitement. They’re trying to get the other person to just lose their mind,

00:23:49.320 --> 00:23:53.640
you know, and start screaming back or something, and you’re always very calm and…

00:23:53.640 --> 00:24:00.240
JIM: Of course, there’s room for that. I encourage everyone to be a form of scambaiter. If you can

00:24:00.240 --> 00:24:04.840
waste someone’s time who’s — who you know is trying to steal money from you, it means

00:24:04.840 --> 00:24:09.680
they’re not stealing money from your parents, grandparents, and whatever. So, absolutely there’s

00:24:09.680 --> 00:24:16.960
room for everyone. I encourage everyone to do what I do. Well, maybe not quite as far as I go because

00:24:16.960 --> 00:24:22.520
it could land you in trouble, and — but there’s nothing wrong with wasting a scammer’s time.

00:24:22.520 --> 00:24:27.240
JACK: Huh, he’s encouraging everyone to waste scammers’ time, and that’s an interesting idea,

00:24:27.240 --> 00:24:30.920
I think. Imagine if every time you got a call from one of these scammers, you instantly got excited

00:24:30.920 --> 00:24:34.960
and you’re like, oh boy, this is gonna be a fun call. Of course, you don’t give them access to

00:24:34.960 --> 00:24:40.000
your computer or send them money, but what could you do to waste their time? I say someone should

00:24:40.000 --> 00:24:44.720
just create an app on my phone that’s AI-driven, that I could just pass the call over to it and

00:24:44.720 --> 00:24:49.840
it acts like me and it talks to the scammers for hours, keeping them going just a little longer.

00:24:49.840 --> 00:24:55.200
Like, maybe there’s really long loading screens or web pages aren’t loading right or something,

00:24:55.200 --> 00:24:58.640
and things just keep timing out and they have to start all over again. You know,

00:24:58.640 --> 00:25:02.960
there are a few scambaiters out there, and one of them is called Kitboga, and I did see him

00:25:02.960 --> 00:25:08.840
dabbling with a AI bot tool to try to waste scammers’ time. [MUSIC] But as Jim spent more

00:25:08.840 --> 00:25:14.680
and more time with these scammers, something really fascinating happened to him one day. He

00:25:14.680 --> 00:25:21.960
somehow ended up controlling one of the scammers’ PCs, and this sent Jim in a whole new direction.

00:25:21.960 --> 00:25:27.760
JIM: The very first time that I was able to connect to a scammer’s computer was that the

00:25:27.760 --> 00:25:36.520
scammer actually gave me his user ID and password to connect to him, and then he would switch sides.

00:25:36.520 --> 00:25:42.760
So, there was a period of time where if the scammers were using a bit of remote access

00:25:42.760 --> 00:25:47.800
software called TeamViewer, if they were using TeamViewer and the connections were coming from

00:25:47.800 --> 00:25:55.600
India, TeamViewer noticed that a lot of them were scams and they actually banned the entire country

00:25:55.600 --> 00:26:01.680
for a period of time. During that time, they wanted to keep the scams running, so what the

00:26:01.680 --> 00:26:09.160
scammers would do is say, well, you connect to me. There’s a little bit of software internally that

00:26:09.160 --> 00:26:16.480
says ‘switch sides with partner’, and then they would connect back to the victim, supposedly. So,

00:26:16.480 --> 00:26:21.220
I was actually given the scammer’s username and password, so I can connect to their computer.

00:26:21.220 --> 00:26:26.000
JACK: That must have been — the first time you did that, that must have been such a wild moment.

00:26:26.000 --> 00:26:30.600
JIM: Oh, it was unbelievable because what you can do is exactly what the scammers do,

00:26:30.600 --> 00:26:35.680
which is as soon as you make that connection, you can lock their keyboard and mouse and

00:26:35.680 --> 00:26:41.840
blacken their screen. So, I knew how to do that because I had seen it so often. So,

00:26:41.840 --> 00:26:48.560
this was a real gift for me. So, I connected to them, locked them out of their computer,

00:26:48.560 --> 00:26:51.760
started to download all the files to try and figure out who this was…

00:26:51.760 --> 00:26:56.660
SCAMMER5: Now, just beside ‘communicate’, do you see the option which says ‘connect to partner’?

00:26:56.660 --> 00:26:57.560
JIM: Yeah, okay.

00:26:57.560 --> 00:27:00.000
SCAMMER5: Hey, what are you doing?

00:27:00.000 --> 00:27:05.840
JIM: I can’t see ‘communicate’. Are you still there?

00:27:05.840 --> 00:27:07.075
SCAMMER5: [AUDIO BREAKING UP]

00:27:07.075 --> 00:27:10.600
JIM: Well, you are — you’re the one who’s scamming, aren’t you? [TO JACK] Of course,

00:27:10.600 --> 00:27:13.800
because their computer is completely locked and black-screened, they’re

00:27:13.800 --> 00:27:18.800
not really quite sure what goes on. They maybe hadn’t encountered this before. So,

00:27:18.800 --> 00:27:24.640
I knew that my time was probably limited, so I grabbed as much as I could from — I can download

00:27:24.640 --> 00:27:29.920
all their files. They weren’t seeing any of this, and I was able to work out exactly who they were.

00:27:29.920 --> 00:27:36.680
JACK: This is why I love watching Jim’s YouTube videos. This isn’t the only time he hacked into a

00:27:36.680 --> 00:27:41.720
scammer’s computer. He does it practically every video now. He’s figured out so many different

00:27:41.720 --> 00:27:48.040
ways to get into the scammer’s computers. You just heard one way he does it, and he won’t

00:27:48.040 --> 00:27:53.080
tell me any of the other ways that he gets into these computers because he says if he tells us,

00:27:53.080 --> 00:27:57.760
then the scammers are gonna hear this and fix it and he’ll lose access, so he keeps

00:27:57.760 --> 00:28:04.200
his little hacking methods secret. But my mind cannot help but start to brainstorm ideas on how

00:28:04.200 --> 00:28:09.360
you could hack into a scammer’s computer. So, let me just think out loud here for a minute. Okay,

00:28:09.360 --> 00:28:14.960
so, when you connect — when the scammer connects into Jim’s computer to do that remote support,

00:28:14.960 --> 00:28:19.680
right, that scammer’s gonna be coming from a specific IP, and Jim could probably see that,

00:28:19.680 --> 00:28:25.080
right? If he does Wireshark or something, he could capture that IP, and then he’s got their

00:28:25.080 --> 00:28:31.000
public IP. From there, could he then port scan that IP and look for open ports and then try

00:28:31.000 --> 00:28:36.800
to find some exploits or vulnerabilities to hit those ports? Maybe. Maybe that is

00:28:36.800 --> 00:28:44.160
possible. Another thing is if they’re using some remote desktop software, is there a bug

00:28:44.160 --> 00:28:50.320
in that software that Jim can exploit to reverse the connection? I don’t know how he does it,

00:28:50.320 --> 00:28:54.520
but even if I hit the nail on the head, Jim’s not gonna admit to how he hacks into their computers.

00:28:54.520 --> 00:29:01.200
JIM: No, and I probably never will simply because scammers will learn from that,

00:29:01.200 --> 00:29:05.360
and unfortunately they watch my videos just like a lot of other people do,

00:29:05.360 --> 00:29:13.480
and I don’t want to reveal that as a secret. But suffice to say, a lot of it is social engineering

00:29:13.480 --> 00:29:20.200
as opposed to some zero-day compromise of the remote access software that I’m using. So,

00:29:20.200 --> 00:29:24.880
I’m far more of a social engineer than a hacker, if that makes sense.

00:29:24.880 --> 00:29:28.160
JACK: We’re gonna take a quick commercial break but when we come back,

00:29:28.160 --> 00:29:32.040
I’m gonna play you some of my favorite clips from his channel, and you’re not gonna want to

00:29:32.040 --> 00:29:38.520
miss this. Jim is known for hacking into scammers’ computers and exposing them,

00:29:38.520 --> 00:29:42.560
and it’s really quite wild to watch. He has over a hundred videos on YouTube now,

00:29:42.560 --> 00:29:47.720
and many of them are exactly this, and it’s amazing just to hear the scammer’s reaction

00:29:47.720 --> 00:29:54.560
when he tells them some detail about them that he shouldn’t know. For instance, there’s one

00:29:54.560 --> 00:29:59.880
where he hacked into someone’s computer in the call center and got a list of everyone’s names

00:29:59.880 --> 00:30:06.300
and their fake names. This was one of my favorite videos. Let me just play a clip for you from it.

00:30:06.300 --> 00:30:07.500
JIM: Hello?

00:30:07.500 --> 00:30:08.880
SCAMMER6: Hello?

00:30:08.880 --> 00:30:10.200
JIM: Hello.

00:30:10.200 --> 00:30:16.020
SCAMMER6: Yeah, hi, sir. My name is Catalina Fernandez. I am calling you from the Microsoft.

00:30:16.020 --> 00:30:19.138
JIM: Oh, hi, Priya.

00:30:19.138 --> 00:30:19.340
SCAMMER6: [GASPS] JIM: Hi.

00:30:19.340 --> 00:30:20.260
SCAMMER6: Who are you?

00:30:20.260 --> 00:30:21.619
JIM: I’m a ghost.

00:30:21.619 --> 00:30:23.160
SCAMMER6: Idiot. JIM: Don’t call me an idiot. I’m a ghost.

00:30:23.160 --> 00:30:25.180
SCAMMER6: What’s your name? Tell me your name.

00:30:25.180 --> 00:30:29.620
JIM: My name is Ghost.

00:30:29.620 --> 00:30:36.080
SCAMMER6: I don’t understand. You tell me — you already tell my name.

00:30:36.080 --> 00:30:51.980
JIM: I know. You’re Priya. I’m a ghost, you see? Priya? At least talk to me. Hello? Hello?

00:30:51.980 --> 00:30:52.900
SCAMMER7: Hello.

00:30:52.900 --> 00:30:54.040
JIM: Yeah, who’s this?

00:30:54.040 --> 00:30:54.520
SCAMMER7: Hello?

00:30:54.520 --> 00:30:56.040
JIM: Who’s this?

00:30:56.040 --> 00:30:57.940
SCAMMER7: Yeah, do you know my name?

00:30:57.940 --> 00:30:59.800
JIM: I don’t know. What is your name?

00:30:59.800 --> 00:31:03.840
JACK: I love this part. You can hear this guy’s brain just breaking real time.

00:31:03.840 --> 00:31:04.920
JIM: What is your name?

00:31:04.920 --> 00:31:06.760
SCAMMER7: I’m talking about — yeah,

00:31:06.760 --> 00:31:10.300
I’m talking about your computer. You have a Windows computer, right?

00:31:10.300 --> 00:31:14.560
JIM: I do, but I don’t understand why you can’t tell me your name.

00:31:14.560 --> 00:31:19.480
JACK: At this point, this entire call center is listening in on this call. Like,

00:31:19.480 --> 00:31:24.360
what is happening here? They even have him on speakerphone, and this new lady jumps on the call.

00:31:24.360 --> 00:31:24.960
JIM: Hello.

00:31:24.960 --> 00:31:25.560
SCAMMER8: Hello?

00:31:25.560 --> 00:31:26.720
JIM: Yes, hello. Who’s this?

00:31:26.720 --> 00:31:28.140
SCAMMER8: Yes, hello.

00:31:28.140 --> 00:31:29.739
JIM: Who am I talking to?

00:31:29.739 --> 00:31:31.200
SCAMMER8: Hello? JIM: Yes, who am I talking to?

00:31:31.200 --> 00:31:34.040
SCAMMER8: Yeah, hi, this is Mary William from the

00:31:34.040 --> 00:31:39.320
headquarter of Microsoft Security Department. Tell me what happened.

00:31:39.320 --> 00:31:44.020
JIM: Mary, are you sure your name is Mary?

00:31:44.020 --> 00:31:48.060
SCAMMER8: Yeah, definitely. I know my name. I’m very sure for it.

00:31:48.060 --> 00:31:50.340
JIM: But it’s actually Sushmita.

00:31:50.340 --> 00:31:57.807
SCAMMER8: No, my — not — I’m not Sushmita. My name is Mary William.

00:31:57.807 --> 00:31:58.995
JIM: Are you getting… SCAMMER8: Do you understand?

00:31:58.995 --> 00:32:01.880
JIM: Are you getting a little bit hot, Sushmita?

00:32:01.880 --> 00:32:09.180
SCAMMER8: Sorry, no. Listen, you are speaking to me and my name is Mary.

00:32:09.180 --> 00:32:14.680
JACK: Now Priya picks the phone back up, and she’s really curious and wants some answers.

00:32:14.680 --> 00:32:16.340
SCAMMER6: Can I request you, sir…?

00:32:16.340 --> 00:32:17.040
JIM: Yeah.

00:32:17.040 --> 00:32:18.520
SCAMMER6: Just one request.

00:32:18.520 --> 00:32:19.080
JIM: Yeah.

00:32:19.080 --> 00:32:23.160
SCAMMER6: Can you please tell me, sir, how do you know the names that — like,

00:32:23.160 --> 00:32:29.040
Priya, Sushmita? Like, they’re Indian names. Where are you getting from?

00:32:29.040 --> 00:32:32.360
JIM: Did I get that right? ‘Cause I was just guessing.

00:32:32.360 --> 00:32:40.840
SCAMMER6: No. So, you are using some technology or anything? How do you know the names?

00:32:40.840 --> 00:32:45.400
JIM: I’m just very good at reading people’s thoughts over the phone,

00:32:45.400 --> 00:32:47.920
and I get this aura. I’m like a ghost.

00:32:47.920 --> 00:32:48.654
SCAMMER6: Really?

00:32:48.654 --> 00:32:48.670
JIM: Yeah, yeah.

00:32:48.670 --> 00:32:56.840
SCAMMER6: But sir, it’s quite impossible that — how do you know the name by hearing their voice?

00:32:56.840 --> 00:33:01.800
JIM: Just simply because whenever you speak to me, I can pick up on

00:33:01.800 --> 00:33:07.940
vibes and I kinda know — you create an aura around you. I’m a little bit like a ghost.

00:33:07.940 --> 00:33:14.500
SCAMMER6: Okay, yeah, I’m from Microsoft, sir, and you are talking about a [inaudible], right?

00:33:14.500 --> 00:33:20.000
JIM: Oh, Priya, please don’t do this to me. Come on, you don’t really work for Microsoft, do you?

00:33:20.000 --> 00:33:25.246
SCAMMER6: Sir, my name is not Priya. I’m not Priya, sir.

00:33:25.246 --> 00:33:26.420
JIM: You’re not Priya. SCAMMER6: Again, you made a mistake.

00:33:26.420 --> 00:33:30.640
JIM: Okay, but you confirmed that to me earlier and you said your friends were

00:33:30.640 --> 00:33:36.984
Sushmita and Mimi and — you told me that earlier, so you’ve already confirmed that.

00:33:36.984 --> 00:33:41.460
SCAMMER6: Mimi, yes, and then you used — you can use another name for me.

00:33:41.460 --> 00:33:44.460
JIM: Well, is Priya not your name?

00:33:44.460 --> 00:33:46.440
SCAMMER6: No, I’m not.

00:33:46.440 --> 00:33:50.820
JIM: Oh, Carolina Fernandez; you’re sticking to that, are you?

00:33:50.820 --> 00:33:54.954
SCAMMER6: Yes, I’m Carolina Fernandez.

00:33:54.954 --> 00:33:54.978
JIM: Carolina Fernandez.

00:33:54.978 --> 00:33:57.440
SCAMMER6: Why are you using the Indian names? Okay, yeah.

00:33:57.440 --> 00:33:59.040
JIM: Right, okay. Well, whatever you want,

00:33:59.040 --> 00:34:03.160
Carolina. I don’t really mind. So, what’s really wrong with my computer?

00:34:03.160 --> 00:34:08.459
SCAMMER6: Sir, your computer is completely infected by some hackers.

00:34:08.459 --> 00:34:08.470
JIM: Right.

00:34:08.470 --> 00:34:12.580
SCAMMER6: That’s why we are receiving some warning signals from your computer.

00:34:12.580 --> 00:34:13.600
JIM: Okay.

00:34:13.600 --> 00:34:14.320
SCAMMER6: Okay?

00:34:14.320 --> 00:34:15.160
JIM: Okay.

00:34:15.160 --> 00:34:18.440
SCAMMER6: And that point of time, sir,

00:34:18.440 --> 00:34:23.400
we are calling you to make you aware about your computer problem, okay?

00:34:23.400 --> 00:34:26.920
JIM: Okay.

00:34:26.920 --> 00:34:30.688
SCAMMER6: [SPEAKING INDIAN] JIM: Hello? Yeah, are you still there?

00:34:30.688 --> 00:34:31.800
SCAMMER6: [SPEAKING INDIAN] JIM: Hello?

00:34:31.800 --> 00:34:33.240
SCAMMER9: Hello?

00:34:33.240 --> 00:34:35.040
JIM: Sorry, your colleague’s listening in,

00:34:35.040 --> 00:34:38.226
but I can hear her talk as well. Oh, she’s hung up. That’s okay.

00:34:38.226 --> 00:34:38.640
SCAMMER9: Um, uh…

00:34:38.640 --> 00:34:40.480
JIM: Yeah, no, she wasn’t very good, was she?

00:34:40.480 --> 00:34:44.840
SCAMMER9: Oh my god. Who are you, sir? May I know, who are you?

00:34:44.840 --> 00:34:51.120
JIM: I just told you. You can call me Ghost, ‘cause that’s kind of the way I

00:34:51.120 --> 00:34:56.880
feel. I get this aura around people. I can tell who’s around them. I can tell just…

00:34:56.880 --> 00:34:57.839
SCAMMER9: So, what is your job, sir?

00:34:57.839 --> 00:34:58.420
JIM: How long have you been working there, Priya? SCAMMER9: You tell me the exact location.

00:34:58.420 --> 00:35:01.640
JIM: How long have you been working there?

00:35:01.640 --> 00:35:07.428
SCAMMER9: Well, I’m working. Tell me the location…

00:35:07.428 --> 00:35:08.141
JIM: A fake Microsoft.

00:35:08.141 --> 00:35:09.280
SCAMMER9: …where I am working.

00:35:09.280 --> 00:35:11.225
JIM: Salt Lake, Sector-V.

00:35:11.225 --> 00:35:12.760
SCAMMER9: Yes, then why you…

00:35:12.760 --> 00:35:14.679
JIM: Salt Lake, Sector-V.

00:35:14.679 --> 00:35:14.750
SCAMMER9: Why are you taking the name of…? JIM: Salt Lake, Sector-V…

00:35:14.750 --> 00:35:15.320
SCAMMER9: Kolkata?

00:35:15.320 --> 00:35:17.360
JIM: Salt Lake, Sector-V.

00:35:17.360 --> 00:35:18.200
SCAMMER9: Sorry?

00:35:18.200 --> 00:35:20.320
JIM: You heard.

00:35:20.320 --> 00:35:24.515
SCAMMER9: [SPEAKING INDIAN]

00:35:24.515 --> 00:35:28.420
JIM: Hello? Please don’t hang up. Hello?

00:35:28.420 --> 00:35:32.020
SCAMMER9: No, no. I’m here, I’m here, I’m here.

00:35:32.020 --> 00:35:34.500
JIM: What’s the weather like there?

00:35:34.500 --> 00:35:37.360
SCAMMER9: Weather? Now it’s…

00:35:37.360 --> 00:35:41.780
JIM: Yeah, what’s the weather like in Kolkata?

00:35:41.780 --> 00:35:47.421
SCAMMER9: You tell me. You know everything about me. Then you tell me…

00:35:47.421 --> 00:35:47.455
JIM: I’d say about 33 degrees…

00:35:47.455 --> 00:35:49.770
SCAMMER9: …what is the weather, what’s my name. Do you know my father’s name?

00:35:49.770 --> 00:35:49.827
JIM: …33 degrees, it’s raining. Yeah, I dunno what…

00:35:49.827 --> 00:35:51.120
SCAMMER9: Do you know my father’s name?

00:35:51.120 --> 00:36:00.880
JIM: I dunno, but is your father proud of you, what you do? Does he think you work for Microsoft?

00:36:00.880 --> 00:36:03.600
SCAMMER9: Yes, of course.

00:36:03.600 --> 00:36:06.860
JIM: But you don’t work for Microsoft. Did you tell him that?

00:36:06.860 --> 00:36:11.082
SCAMMER9: Sir, you just tell me one thing. Why are you wasting my time?

00:36:11.082 --> 00:36:13.475
JIM: I’m not wasting time. SCAMMER9: I’m talking about your computer and…

00:36:13.475 --> 00:36:19.000
JIM: I’m trying to — you know, you give off this aura and I’m trying to kind of work out

00:36:19.000 --> 00:36:23.160
why you do all this scamming stuff. That’s really what I wanted to know.

00:36:23.160 --> 00:36:26.080
SCAMMER9: Then why are you wasting your time?

00:36:26.080 --> 00:36:28.960
JIM: Can’t you get a different job?

00:36:28.960 --> 00:36:32.555
SCAMMER9: And how do you know the names? How do you know the names?

00:36:32.555 --> 00:36:33.347
JIM: I know everybody’s name.

00:36:33.347 --> 00:36:34.180
SCAMMER9: Do you know another name?

00:36:34.180 --> 00:36:34.830
JIM: Yes, everybody.

00:36:34.830 --> 00:36:36.060
SCAMMER9: How many names do you know?

00:36:36.060 --> 00:36:36.980
JIM: Everybody.

00:36:36.980 --> 00:36:38.695
SCAMMER9: Tell me the names.

00:36:38.695 --> 00:36:38.710
JIM: Everybody.

00:36:38.710 --> 00:36:40.620
SCAMMER9: Tell me the — tell me my colleague’s name.

00:36:40.620 --> 00:36:43.014
JIM: I’ll tell you one more name…

00:36:43.014 --> 00:36:44.720
SCAMMER9: One by one. JIM: Will I tell you one more name?

00:36:44.720 --> 00:36:45.520
SCAMMER9: Yes.

00:36:45.520 --> 00:36:46.541
JIM: Suini.

00:36:46.541 --> 00:36:49.641
SCAMMER9: Yes? JIM: Suini.

00:36:49.641 --> 00:36:57.360
SCAMMER9: [GASPS] [BACKGROUND CHATTER] My god, Suini! And tell me another name.

00:36:57.360 --> 00:37:00.760
JIM: No, I’m not gonna — look, I get this from…

00:37:00.760 --> 00:37:02.480
SCAMMER9: Any male names?

00:37:02.480 --> 00:37:04.150
JIM: Well, apart from Abhijit…

00:37:04.150 --> 00:37:04.880
SCAMMER9: Any male names?

00:37:04.880 --> 00:37:07.020
JIM: Yeah, apart from Abhijit?

00:37:07.020 --> 00:37:13.880
SCAMMER9: So, I do respect your talents, okay? Can you please…? Yes,

00:37:13.880 --> 00:37:18.940
I’m here. Can you please tell me who is beside me right now?

00:37:18.940 --> 00:37:22.280
JIM: Which side?

00:37:22.280 --> 00:37:26.080
SCAMMER9: In my left-hand side.

00:37:26.080 --> 00:37:34.240
JIM: I think that’s Mimi.

00:37:34.240 --> 00:37:34.275
SCAMMER9: [GASPS] [BACKGROUND TALK]

00:37:34.275 --> 00:37:44.720
JIM: Hello? Did I get that right? Hello? Hello? Hello?

00:37:44.720 --> 00:37:45.350
SCAMMER9: Okay…

00:37:45.350 --> 00:37:46.878
JIM: You went very quiet.

00:37:46.878 --> 00:37:48.860
SCAMMER9: Okay, yes, yes, I’m here. JIM: Can you tell me, did I get it right?

00:37:48.860 --> 00:37:50.240
SCAMMER9: I’m so excited.

00:37:50.240 --> 00:37:51.381
JIM: Did I get it right, though?

00:37:51.381 --> 00:37:52.546
SCAMMER9: I’m so excited about you, sir.

00:37:52.546 --> 00:37:53.546
JIM: ‘Cause this doesn’t always work.

00:37:53.546 --> 00:37:54.520
SCAMMER9: Who are you?

00:37:54.520 --> 00:37:55.785
JIM: Did I get it right?

00:37:55.785 --> 00:37:58.840
SCAMMER9: Tell me who is — who — wait, wait, wait. Can you hear me properly?

00:37:58.840 --> 00:38:01.080
JIM: You keep asking me questions. Can I ask you

00:38:01.080 --> 00:38:07.700
one thing? Did I get that right? ‘Cause I can never tell. Is Mimi on your left?

00:38:07.700 --> 00:38:12.520
SCAMMER9: And right-hand side? In my right-hand side?

00:38:12.520 --> 00:38:24.163
JIM: It’s coming through to me. I’m not sure. I’m pretty sure that’s Sushmita.

00:38:24.163 --> 00:38:24.194
SCAMMER9: [BACKGROUND LAUGHING]

00:38:24.194 --> 00:38:30.320
JACK: I love it. Jim caused such chaos in that scam call center. He told them their real names,

00:38:30.320 --> 00:38:34.880
their location, even the name of the company that employed them, and they passed this phone

00:38:34.880 --> 00:38:40.640
around to at least five different agents to talk to him. Of course, any information that Jim does

00:38:40.640 --> 00:38:45.320
get from hacking these scammers, he reports it. So, if he sees that they use a certain service,

00:38:45.320 --> 00:38:48.960
he’ll report that to the service provider that scammers are using their product, and this is

00:38:48.960 --> 00:38:53.400
their user ID. He’s gotten some of the actually banned from using certain software, but they

00:38:53.400 --> 00:38:59.320
could just make a new company and then register the software again under a new company name.

00:38:59.320 --> 00:39:04.600
Sometimes when these scam centers make new company names, they even get their company listed by the

00:39:04.600 --> 00:39:10.440
Better Business Bureau and then even get some people to make fake reviews about their company.

00:39:10.440 --> 00:39:14.880
So, if he can find this, he’ll definitely report that to the Better Business Bureau,

00:39:14.880 --> 00:39:20.240
and he’ll do everything he can to slow down these scammers and waste their time. Once

00:39:20.240 --> 00:39:25.480
he got into a scammer’s computer and grabbed all their files, and in there was a plane ticket for

00:39:25.480 --> 00:39:30.440
a recent trip. So, Jim had this guy’s real name, his travel details, and from there he could look

00:39:30.440 --> 00:39:36.960
the guy up on Facebook and find his friends and family. Yeah, when these scammers call him up and

00:39:36.960 --> 00:39:43.320
have no idea that Jim has all this information on them, it’s quite a riot to watch the whole

00:39:43.320 --> 00:39:47.960
thing unfold. [TO JIM] The question does come up, though — and I’m sure you’ve answered this

00:39:47.960 --> 00:39:54.400
a thousand times — which is like, hold on a second, hacking is illegal. You can’t just go

00:39:54.400 --> 00:40:00.520
hack people’s stuff, and here you are hacking into someone else’s machine. What’s going on

00:40:00.520 --> 00:40:05.000
here? Where’s your justification? Where’s your moral compass or ethical framework in this way?

00:40:05.000 --> 00:40:12.160
JIM: Yeah, the moral bit is quite easy for me because I quite deliberately let the scammers

00:40:12.160 --> 00:40:19.160
attempt to scam me. I cannot — I don’t have the technical expertise, should we say,

00:40:19.160 --> 00:40:27.080
to arbitrarily hack into anything. I can’t do it. I’m not able to do that. A lot of the people that

00:40:27.080 --> 00:40:35.720
you’ve spoken to on this podcast probably would be able to do that. I cannot. I have to rely on

00:40:35.720 --> 00:40:42.440
a scammer connecting to me and trying to steal money from me, and that’s the only way that I

00:40:42.440 --> 00:40:48.600
can ever access their computers. They have to try to steal money from me first. So, morally…

00:40:48.600 --> 00:40:52.240
JACK: This is a really nice ethical line you’ve painted yourself. Like,

00:40:52.240 --> 00:40:58.040
okay, you know what? Unless you walk into my home and get onto my computer and attempt to

00:40:58.040 --> 00:41:02.800
steal money from me, I’m not gonna do anything to you, and once they do that…

00:41:02.800 --> 00:41:03.240
JIM: Correct.

00:41:03.240 --> 00:41:06.600
JACK: …and you open your door to allow that to happen, and you see — okay…

00:41:06.600 --> 00:41:11.640
JIM: I mean, I’m not — and I hate to be known as a hacker ‘cause that always has quite negative

00:41:11.640 --> 00:41:19.640
connotations, and I hate the term because it just has all of that baggage. But that is true,

00:41:19.640 --> 00:41:27.080
and every single person that I feature on any video on YouTube has at some point connected to

00:41:27.080 --> 00:41:32.320
my computer and they — don’t forget; scammers don’t always make it clear that what you’re

00:41:32.320 --> 00:41:39.560
typing out gives them access to my computer, because they will quite deliberately say,

00:41:39.560 --> 00:41:45.080
just type this on your command — like, when they — when people question, well,

00:41:45.080 --> 00:41:48.280
what is this thing that you’re getting me to download and run and it’s in fact

00:41:48.280 --> 00:41:56.520
a remote access tool, they will not explain that. So, already there is a remote access

00:41:56.520 --> 00:42:02.840
connection which is a sort of hacking attempt, because the scammer doesn’t make it clear to

00:42:02.840 --> 00:42:10.480
the victim they are taking access of your computer and they are not making it clear.

00:42:10.480 --> 00:42:19.120
Obviously they’re scammers. I just go a little bit further to say, well, okay, you’re trying to

00:42:19.120 --> 00:42:27.440
misuse my computer. So, internally I’m thinking you’re now fair game for me to do the same to

00:42:27.440 --> 00:42:33.480
you. So, the only people — and I’ve said this a number of time in other interviews as well;

00:42:33.480 --> 00:42:41.040
the only people who could ever have a problem with what I do are the people who try to steal money

00:42:41.040 --> 00:42:50.600
from others, okay? If they ever want to raise a legal complaint or whatever, please bring that on,

00:42:50.600 --> 00:42:58.280
because I — what I will have done is record, hi, I managed to get access to their computer, and the

00:42:58.280 --> 00:43:05.320
answer is because they were trying to steal money from me. Now, that’s not a defense on its own,

00:43:05.320 --> 00:43:12.920
but it just means that if I ever have to defend myself for any reason, I have a good reason as to

00:43:12.920 --> 00:43:19.240
why I have access to their computer and it’s just because of this theft that they’re attempting.

00:43:19.240 --> 00:43:23.800
JACK: There’s almost no recourse that they can have. I mean, I’m assuming you haven’t

00:43:23.800 --> 00:43:28.071
had any legal complaints that you’ve had to have — seriously take care of.

00:43:28.071 --> 00:43:35.040
JIM: Not once, not once. The only complaints I’ve ever had are privacy complaints on YouTube.

00:43:35.040 --> 00:43:51.106
Scammers don’t like their faces or voices or documents displayed on YouTube, and — tough.

00:43:51.106 --> 00:43:56.320
JACK: [MUSIC] Okay, so, my absolute favorite video of Jim’s is when he hacked into an entire

00:43:56.320 --> 00:43:59.680
call center and could watch everything that was going on there. [TO JIM] Wait,

00:43:59.680 --> 00:44:05.629
first, before we get into this story, how do you typically find these scammers?

00:44:05.629 --> 00:44:09.840
JIM: Yeah, I have my e-mail address on YouTube and a lot of people just simply e-mail me saying,

00:44:09.840 --> 00:44:13.920
hey, have you seen this pop-up, or I’ve just had a phone call from this number,

00:44:13.920 --> 00:44:19.880
and — or I’ve had this e-mail and it’s a fake invoice, or I — my grandparents

00:44:19.880 --> 00:44:25.200
have just been scammed; he used the phone. I get all of that all the time. But actually,

00:44:25.200 --> 00:44:31.640
in a lot of ways I don’t even have to use that because I’m on what’s called a mug’s list. So,

00:44:31.640 --> 00:44:37.120
in the past I have pretended to pay scammers because — remember this bit where I say I actually

00:44:37.120 --> 00:44:44.520
lead the scammers on? I give them fake information including credit card details, and if you work

00:44:44.520 --> 00:44:50.280
your way onto a list of people who they think they’ve scammed in the past, they will call you

00:44:50.280 --> 00:44:58.240
again and again. Those lists are like gold dust for scammers. So, the end result of that is I get

00:44:58.240 --> 00:45:03.760
so many phone calls directly to my home phone number that I don’t need anyone else’s input.

00:45:03.760 --> 00:45:09.720
I’m already in the middle of a load of scams and honestly, there’s nearly too many to cope with.

00:45:09.720 --> 00:45:12.820
JACK: So, what do you have, like sixteen different phones over there?

00:45:12.820 --> 00:45:17.560
JIM: I do, literally. I mean, I have one phone service with ten different

00:45:17.560 --> 00:45:21.720
phone numbers in the UK and I have something similar with US phone numbers,

00:45:21.720 --> 00:45:26.360
though I’ve dropped a lot of those recently from the number — it’s just — it’s nearly got to the

00:45:26.360 --> 00:45:34.420
point where I just can’t have an evening free of scam phone calls.

00:45:34.420 --> 00:45:40.080
JACK: Okay, but this story doesn’t start with an inbound phone call. Instead,

00:45:40.080 --> 00:45:46.760
someone told Jim about a malvert. This is an ad on a website which has malware on it. Basically,

00:45:46.760 --> 00:45:49.175
if you went to a website, you would hear this.

00:45:49.175 --> 00:45:54.440
MESSAGE: [ROBOTIC VOICE] Important security message: your computer has been locked up. Your

00:45:54.440 --> 00:45:58.880
IP address was used without your knowledge or consent to visit websites that contains

00:45:58.880 --> 00:46:05.600
identity theft virus. To unlock the computer, please call support immediately. Please do not

00:46:05.600 --> 00:46:10.560
attempt to shut down or restart your computer. Doing that may lead to data loss and identity

00:46:10.560 --> 00:46:17.340
theft. The computer lock is aimed to stop illegal activity. Please call our support immediately.

00:46:17.340 --> 00:46:22.480
JACK: Now, this was just an ad on a website, but it had some malicious JavaScript in it

00:46:22.480 --> 00:46:28.600
which maximized the browser, showed this giant warning, played this audio on repeat, and then

00:46:28.600 --> 00:46:34.960
made the mouse disappear which made it seem like the screen was frozen. It’s not actually a virus,

00:46:34.960 --> 00:46:40.400
though. You can just tap on Ctrl+Alt+Del and close the browser and all is fine. But to someone who

00:46:40.400 --> 00:46:46.200
doesn’t know better, this could be scary and they might call the number to get help. So,

00:46:46.200 --> 00:46:50.080
Jim called the number and said that his computer is infected, and the scammers

00:46:50.080 --> 00:46:57.400
immediately tried gaining remote access to Jim’s computer and tried to scam him for money. So,

00:46:57.400 --> 00:47:07.120
that means in Jim’s mind, they crossed the line and it was time for him to try to hack them back.

00:47:07.120 --> 00:47:10.880
JIM: [MUSIC] The way that I get access to the reverse access to the — I’ll not go into that

00:47:10.880 --> 00:47:20.160
part in detail. But suffice to say that when I did get access, I got access to just one PC

00:47:20.160 --> 00:47:26.440
and it was from a supervisor, and I was able to watch what that supervisor was doing, and one of

00:47:26.440 --> 00:47:36.160
the things that he was doing was watching CCTV. So, I could see the IP address of the server that

00:47:36.160 --> 00:47:44.800
he was using. It wasn’t an internal server; it was an external one. When he logged into it, he logged

00:47:44.800 --> 00:47:52.240
in with the username of ‘admin’ and a password of eight characters. For the particular CCTV

00:47:52.240 --> 00:48:00.720
system that he was using, I did a Google search of what is the default password for this system,

00:48:00.720 --> 00:48:07.400
and would you believe they were still using the default password? I guess you could call

00:48:07.400 --> 00:48:16.480
that hacking, but I could see the IP address, the username, and I just tried the default password,

00:48:16.480 --> 00:48:22.900
and I was straight in. Admin123 was his password to protect this scam operation.

00:48:22.900 --> 00:48:29.080
JACK: Okay, so, he got into a supervisor’s PC in a scam call center, but then from there was able

00:48:29.080 --> 00:48:34.280
to get into the CCTV system. Now, this scam call center had a lot of cameras. [MUSIC] The

00:48:34.280 --> 00:48:38.520
supervisor could watch all the scammers do their calls and go on break and go outside, and there

00:48:38.520 --> 00:48:44.640
was even a camera in the boss’ office. But that wasn’t it. The supervisor also had the ability to

00:48:44.640 --> 00:48:51.080
listen in on the calls. In fact, all of these calls were being recorded with some software.

00:48:51.080 --> 00:48:56.760
JIM: It was gold dust for me because they had records of all their calls. I could see

00:48:56.760 --> 00:49:01.760
it on which server they were using and I could directly download these things

00:49:01.760 --> 00:49:06.440
because I had access to that scammer’s — supervisor scammer’s computer. So,

00:49:06.440 --> 00:49:13.400
I managed to download nine months’ worth of calls, about 70,000 separate calls.

00:49:13.400 --> 00:49:21.160
JACK: Holy moly, 70,000 calls. Man, this is a much bigger operation than I thought. But Jim

00:49:21.160 --> 00:49:26.520
started going through this and was able to match up some of the time codes of the CCTV footage and

00:49:26.520 --> 00:49:31.520
the recorded calls, and could essentially watch the scammers as they called these victims and

00:49:31.520 --> 00:49:37.240
listen in on the calls. It’s quite fascinating to watch because sometimes the scammers are playing

00:49:37.240 --> 00:49:44.200
video games or looking bored, but this also means he’s starting to identify what they look like,

00:49:44.200 --> 00:49:50.560
where their desk is, where they sit in the room, and how this operation looks from the inside. On

00:49:50.560 --> 00:49:56.120
top of that, on the supervisor’s PC, there was a list of victims which included the amount that

00:49:56.120 --> 00:50:03.480
was stolen from everyone and their names. It was quite a find. Just imagine having this access,

00:50:03.480 --> 00:50:09.960
being in Jim’s position. I mean, if I was in that position, I’d just put the computer down and take

00:50:09.960 --> 00:50:14.240
a walk around the lake or something like that, right? Like, what do you do? What do you do with

00:50:14.240 --> 00:50:21.040
all this? He would open up his computer in the morning and would have live cameras of this scam

00:50:21.040 --> 00:50:26.400
call center on one monitor watching everything that was going on, and then on the other monitor

00:50:26.400 --> 00:50:30.840
he could tap into the phone calls and listen to them live as they were trying to scam victims.

00:50:30.840 --> 00:50:35.880
SCAMMER10: You’re calling support. My name is Alwin. How can I help you today?

00:50:35.880 --> 00:50:37.320
VICTIM1: I just got an important security

00:50:37.320 --> 00:50:41.180
message. I’m making — it says my computer’s being shut down.

00:50:41.180 --> 00:50:50.589
SCAMMER10: What were you doing on the computer when you got this message?

00:50:50.589 --> 00:50:50.629
VICTIM1: [ROBOTIC MESSAGE IN BACKGROUND]

00:50:50.629 --> 00:50:53.680
SCAMMER10: Can you lower down the volume of the computer?

00:50:53.680 --> 00:50:59.520
JACK: He pretty much had full supervisor access to this whole scam call center and

00:50:59.520 --> 00:51:04.840
could watch and listen to anything. But what do you do with that access? It’s

00:51:04.840 --> 00:51:08.680
really tempting to just call them up and be like, hey, hey, I can see you,

00:51:08.680 --> 00:51:12.320
scammer. I can see you wearing a hat and playing video games. I gotcha.

00:51:12.320 --> 00:51:18.440
JIM: Yeah. Oh, it was so tempting that whenever you — I mean, I am watching live

00:51:18.440 --> 00:51:23.520
on the CCTV. I know the number that they’re using the victims to call that day. So,

00:51:23.520 --> 00:51:29.320
I can call that number and I’ll be speaking to somebody in a room that I can see on CCTV.

00:51:29.320 --> 00:51:30.200
SCAMMER11: Hello?

00:51:30.200 --> 00:51:34.680
JIM: Hi. Yeah, so, what’s all this about stopped services,

00:51:34.680 --> 00:51:37.680
then, when they should be running? I don’t get it.

00:51:37.680 --> 00:51:41.480
SCAMMER11: Yeah, sir, you’re ready to go ahead and get it

00:51:41.480 --> 00:51:45.505
fixed? There will be a one-time charge, sir, okay?

00:51:45.505 --> 00:51:49.320
JIM: [TO JACK] I don’t always know who I’m speaking to, and sometimes if the room is full,

00:51:49.320 --> 00:51:52.760
it can be quite difficult to work out which agent. There might be twenty,

00:51:52.760 --> 00:51:58.200
thirty agents in the room, and I can’t always work out who I’m speaking with. There’s four cameras;

00:51:58.200 --> 00:52:05.800
each corner of the room’s got a camera, and what I do is actually invite the scammer onto

00:52:05.800 --> 00:52:11.880
a computer. I had my desktop background set to a purple or a green color, and then what I

00:52:11.880 --> 00:52:17.640
would do is look around the cameras and look for that green screen or that purple screen,

00:52:17.640 --> 00:52:22.400
and then — ah, right; there’s the guy. That’s who I’m talking to. Sometimes I had to do that

00:52:22.400 --> 00:52:29.280
just to work that out. The really, really tempting thing would be to say to the guy,

00:52:29.280 --> 00:52:34.760
hey, that’s a nice Chek shirt you’re wearing, or stop playing Pac-Man whenever you’re speaking to

00:52:34.760 --> 00:52:39.760
me. You know, can you stop doing that? But I couldn’t give the game away. I couldn’t

00:52:39.760 --> 00:52:44.960
be just as obvious as that, although it was incredibly tempting to do that.

00:52:44.960 --> 00:52:53.600
JACK: Yeah, and 70,000 calls with a whole list of victims here,

00:52:53.600 --> 00:52:59.380
this is too much for one person to process all. So, what did you end up doing with this access?

00:52:59.380 --> 00:53:05.560
JIM: So, I kinda figured out I was really onto something quite big at that stage,

00:53:05.560 --> 00:53:15.920
and I thought I would bring it to the attention of more mainstream media, specifically the BBC. I had

00:53:15.920 --> 00:53:23.640
never had contact with the BBC until that point, but because I had to personally try to close down

00:53:23.640 --> 00:53:28.040
a lot of scam operations and being pretty unsuccessful about it — so,

00:53:28.040 --> 00:53:34.040
I have previously gone to the police in India to say, here’s a scam call center on your doorstep;

00:53:34.040 --> 00:53:39.560
here’s where they’re located. I was able to get that sort of information, but nothing really ever

00:53:39.560 --> 00:53:46.240
came of it. I thought, perhaps I’m going about this wrong. Perhaps what I really need is more

00:53:46.240 --> 00:53:55.800
mainstream media involved. So, I got in touch with really a general-purpose BBC e-mail address,

00:53:55.800 --> 00:54:04.240
and before too long I was reached out by a team called Panorama. Panorama are a very long-running

00:54:04.240 --> 00:54:09.720
documentary program where they cover all sorts of current affairs issues. But this particular

00:54:09.720 --> 00:54:16.440
team were interested anyway in scam phone calls, and as soon as I get in touch and said, look,

00:54:16.440 --> 00:54:25.080
this is what I have, of course that team were very — they wanted to work with me from that point.

00:54:25.080 --> 00:54:30.160
JACK: [MUSIC] The BBC has more resources than Jim. They can parse through this massive trove of data

00:54:30.160 --> 00:54:35.480
quicker, and started putting pieces together even more. Together they built quite a detailed

00:54:35.480 --> 00:54:39.480
understanding of this whole scam operation. They figured out the name of the company,

00:54:39.480 --> 00:54:45.160
its address, who owns it, the employees who work there, and the victims, and how much money this

00:54:45.160 --> 00:54:49.760
whole place was making. Again, it was all clearly documented with the video footage

00:54:49.760 --> 00:54:54.720
and the recorded calls and the files that they got from that supervisor’s computer. They had a

00:54:54.720 --> 00:55:01.120
ton of evidence. They even reached out to the victims to let them know they were scammed.

00:55:01.120 --> 00:55:11.680
VICTIM2: I feel angry, angry and upset, angry that someone could do that knowing that there’s nothing

00:55:11.680 --> 00:55:21.420
wrong with the computer, just to extort money from you, and upset with myself that I fell for it.

00:55:21.420 --> 00:55:29.662
JACK: Well, with all this proof, it was time to learn who is leading this operation.

00:55:29.662 --> 00:55:33.280
REPORTER: [MUSIC] We’ve identified the man behind the fraud,

00:55:33.280 --> 00:55:40.040
Amit Chauhan. But Amit Chauhan’s not an ordinary businessman. The hacked footage

00:55:40.040 --> 00:55:47.640
includes recordings from the CCTV in his office. [BACKGROUND NOISE]

00:55:47.640 --> 00:55:55.040
JACK: Okay, this is super interesting. There was a CCTV camera inside Amit’s office,

00:55:55.040 --> 00:56:00.280
the head boss of this whole thing, and it’s the only camera that actually had sound on. So,

00:56:00.280 --> 00:56:05.480
there’s hundreds of hours of him talking on the phone and having meetings with people,

00:56:05.480 --> 00:56:09.280
and in those meetings he’s scheming up new ways to scam people and basically

00:56:09.280 --> 00:56:15.080
admitting to all this criminal activity on camera. It’s extraordinary. Well,

00:56:15.080 --> 00:56:19.400
with all this evidence in hand, the BBC reporter went to India to try to meet with him.

00:56:19.400 --> 00:56:23.640
REPORTER: I want to meet Mr. Chauhan, but he’s away on a luxury holiday in

00:56:23.640 --> 00:56:30.940
Thailand. [PHONE RINGING] So, I can only reach him on the phone.

00:56:30.940 --> 00:56:33.440
AMIT: Hello?

00:56:33.440 --> 00:56:35.420
REPORTER: Hello, is that Amit?

00:56:35.420 --> 00:56:36.720
AMIT: Yes.

00:56:36.720 --> 00:56:38.140
REPORTER: Hi, Amit Chauhan?

00:56:38.140 --> 00:56:39.060
AMIT: Yes.

00:56:39.060 --> 00:56:43.760
REPORTER: I want to get your comment, please, on allegations that you’re scamming people

00:56:43.760 --> 00:56:50.200
in the UK out of thousands of pounds. What would you like to say to that, Mr. Chauhan?

00:56:50.200 --> 00:56:54.480
AMIT: I don’t think there was any case like that.

00:56:54.480 --> 00:56:58.640
There’s no such case. I’ll talk to my lawyer first and then we’ll get back.

00:56:58.640 --> 00:57:02.600
JACK: Well, it was true; there was no such criminal case against him,

00:57:02.600 --> 00:57:05.960
so the BBC reporter went to the police and asked, hey, why don’t

00:57:05.960 --> 00:57:10.920
you crack down on these scam call centers more seriously? Here’s what the Indian police said.

00:57:10.920 --> 00:57:13.280
POLICE: This crime is a difficult crime. It’s

00:57:13.280 --> 00:57:16.640
difficult to crack because we don’t have victim, we don’t have accused,

00:57:16.640 --> 00:57:20.840
we don’t have anything. It’s very difficult to link the accused with the victim.

00:57:20.840 --> 00:57:26.280
JACK: Well, in this particular case, they did have victims, and the BBC recorded the victims’

00:57:26.280 --> 00:57:31.280
testimony to hear how they got scammed. So, when the BBC published this story and when

00:57:31.280 --> 00:57:37.040
Jim publishes YouTube videos, it couldn’t be ignored by the police. They had victims,

00:57:37.040 --> 00:57:41.040
they had evidence, they had the address, they had the name of the boss. It was

00:57:41.040 --> 00:57:46.580
a very easy case to process. So, the Indian police raided the scam center.

00:57:46.580 --> 00:57:52.040
JIM: The police did their raid. They picked up whatever computers they could. They went

00:57:52.040 --> 00:57:59.200
to the boss’ home address, and he lived in the most luxurious accommodation you could imagine,

00:57:59.200 --> 00:58:05.400
something like $6,000 a month to rent the space, which is completely unheard of if you’re in Delhi,

00:58:05.400 --> 00:58:12.920
where he was. What I had expected was that this would be such an easy case for them,

00:58:12.920 --> 00:58:19.120
there would be no problem and ultimately the guy who ran the thing would be locked up,

00:58:19.120 --> 00:58:26.240
but that was very far from the truth. What actually happened was — number one, it took about

00:58:26.240 --> 00:58:32.880
a year for the trial to even come up, then COVID kicked in, so it was delayed by another year,

00:58:32.880 --> 00:58:42.640
but eventually whenever the case did go to trial, the police never actually followed up on any of

00:58:42.640 --> 00:58:50.520
the evidence that was given to them or that they had collected. So, they had scripts about scams

00:58:50.520 --> 00:58:57.160
from the boss’ computer, but they didn’t, for example, follow the money trail from the

00:58:57.160 --> 00:59:03.920
victims to the boss. So, they could very easily — if they had any kind of incentive to do so,

00:59:03.920 --> 00:59:10.120
they could have easily gone to PayPal and say, we need evidence about what happened with this

00:59:10.120 --> 00:59:16.600
particular PayPal account. They never asked for that. They never followed up on any of

00:59:16.600 --> 00:59:23.160
the thing — in fact, what they actually relied on was the one laptop that they managed to pick up.

00:59:23.160 --> 00:59:28.440
Obviously because the documentary had gone out, the YouTube video had gone out, all of

00:59:28.440 --> 00:59:34.240
the computers were immediately wiped before the police actually arrived. So, they only really had

00:59:34.240 --> 00:59:43.640
one laptop to go on, and that wasn’t enough for them. Any of the independent evidence of scams,

00:59:43.640 --> 00:59:50.160
the 70,000 phone calls, the video footage of the scams actually happening, was never presented.

00:59:50.160 --> 00:59:58.080
In fact, what they said was, well, that YouTube footage could have been done by AI or that YouTube

00:59:58.080 --> 01:00:06.200
footage could have been faked. There was — and it looked like the judge just accepted that. So,

01:00:06.200 --> 01:00:14.280
there was no pressure whatsoever to present anything which linked the boss to any of that

01:00:14.280 --> 01:00:21.480
scam victim money, and that is just a travesty because I couldn’t have handed it on a plate

01:00:21.480 --> 01:00:27.960
any more clearly to the police — or indeed, the BBC could have handed the same evidence to the

01:00:27.960 --> 01:00:36.480
police. But the police never came to speak to me, never came to speak to the BBC or follow up with

01:00:36.480 --> 01:00:43.400
any of the evidence that I had presented in the video whatsoever. They just didn’t bother. I can

01:00:43.400 --> 01:00:50.280
only imagine that’s for one of two reasons. One is they’re desperately incompetent or — and which I

01:00:50.280 --> 01:00:55.240
think is the more likely reason — they’ve been paid off, because the guy who was in charge of

01:00:55.240 --> 01:01:02.480
this is the equivalent of a multi-millionaire as a result of those scams, and unfortunately in India,

01:01:02.480 --> 01:01:09.700
corruption is rife. So, I don’t know for sure, but I would imagine that’s what happened.

01:01:09.700 --> 01:01:19.320
JACK: Well, there you go. That’s disappointing. Indian authorities seem to not care about scam

01:01:19.320 --> 01:01:24.800
centers there. It’s illegal but they say they can’t prosecute unless they have the victims,

01:01:24.800 --> 01:01:28.680
and since the victims are far away in another country, they just don’t have enough evidence.

01:01:28.680 --> 01:01:35.480
But even when the police are given the evidence wrapped up with a bow by Jim and the BBC and are

01:01:35.480 --> 01:01:43.160
even introduced to the victims, they still don’t take serious action on this. So, despite Jim’s

01:01:43.160 --> 01:01:50.600
huge efforts of dismantling this whole industry, it looks to me, at least, that it’s only gonna

01:01:50.600 --> 01:02:00.480
keep growing since these criminals can scam victims all day with impunity. [TO JIM] Are

01:02:00.480 --> 01:02:05.360
there situations — I mean, you’ve been doing this for nine years now, and this probably was one of

01:02:05.360 --> 01:02:12.520
them where you had this huge database of victims and all this camera footage and stuff. Are there

01:02:12.520 --> 01:02:17.920
other situations where you have to just do a long stare out a window and take a walk around the lake

01:02:17.920 --> 01:02:24.360
or something wherever you’re — and just think about, what do I do with this situation I’m in?

01:02:24.360 --> 01:02:26.480
JIM: Yeah. Honestly…

01:02:26.480 --> 01:02:28.720
JACK: What are some of the difficult questions that you

01:02:28.720 --> 01:02:31.540
have to — you’re answering — asking yourself?

01:02:31.540 --> 01:02:38.080
JIM: Well, I mean, we’ve covered the moral one and I never have a problem with that one for

01:02:38.080 --> 01:02:45.400
the reason I’ve just described, but equally — it’s actually quite harrowing listening to

01:02:45.400 --> 01:02:52.640
victims actually getting scammed, because there have been times that I have tried to intervene,

01:02:52.640 --> 01:02:56.520
and I’ll have gone as far as — because the scammers typically are on the phone with the

01:02:56.520 --> 01:03:00.920
victims all the time, to their cell phone, and they’re going out to buy giftcards or

01:03:00.920 --> 01:03:07.640
they’re going out to a Bitcoin ATM, and the only way that I can try to get that

01:03:07.640 --> 01:03:14.000
scam stopped is if I can warn a neighbor. If I know they’re going to a certain giftcard store,

01:03:14.000 --> 01:03:17.800
I will call that store and say, this person is about to come in. Here’s

01:03:17.800 --> 01:03:28.600
their name. They’re about to buy $500 worth of giftcards. Could you please stop them?

01:03:28.600 --> 01:03:34.840
It’s incredibly difficult to watch when stores, for example, warn the victim,

01:03:34.840 --> 01:03:42.280
but they — unfortunately they trust the scammer more than the person in the store talking to them,

01:03:42.280 --> 01:03:50.280
and it can be very difficult to listen to that. I’ve had people go to a Bitcoin ATM;

01:03:50.280 --> 01:03:56.440
the store manager has tapped them on the shoulder and said, you’re being scammed. That person who

01:03:56.440 --> 01:04:03.440
says they’re from Customs are not who they say they are, and if you put money into that Bitcoin

01:04:03.440 --> 01:04:09.280
ATM, you are going to lose it. They’ve actually explained that they’re being scammed, but yet

01:04:09.280 --> 01:04:14.640
they trust the scammer more and they’ve moved onto the next Bitcoin ATM. I’ve had that happen right

01:04:14.640 --> 01:04:21.840
in front of me, and it’s incredibly difficult to watch that because that could be my grandmother,

01:04:21.840 --> 01:04:29.640
my grandfather, your parents. It’s someone’s relative, yet you can’t do anything about it.

01:04:29.640 --> 01:04:34.400
You try your best, but there are some people who are just going to be scammed. There’s very

01:04:34.400 --> 01:04:38.980
little that can be done about it, and that is very hard to listen to. It is very hard to watch it.

01:04:38.980 --> 01:04:40.600
JACK: Can I just do one last quick question?

01:04:40.600 --> 01:04:42.360
JIM: Sure, yeah, yeah. Absolutely, yeah.

01:04:42.360 --> 01:04:45.380
JACK: Have you ever visited India or do you ever plan to go?

01:04:45.380 --> 01:04:52.680
JIM: Actually, I would love to see India, and I’m honest about that because — and I’ve spoken with

01:04:52.680 --> 01:04:57.920
Karl Rock, sort of my partner-in-crime when it comes to all the drone footage and so on,

01:04:57.920 --> 01:05:06.400
and I actually admire India as a country, and I’m not just saying this to kind of

01:05:06.400 --> 01:05:13.800
justify me slagging off people in India when they’re scamming. This is a country

01:05:13.800 --> 01:05:19.120
that I genuinely would like to see, and I do intend to go there. I will be at some

01:05:19.120 --> 01:05:23.600
point in Delhi. The nice thing about my YouTube channel is I don’t show my face,

01:05:23.600 --> 01:05:30.320
so I’m not that scared about going. I probably would stand out a little bit if I went to

01:05:30.320 --> 01:05:46.377
Kolkata or Calcutta, but Delhi I think would be quite a place that I could easily go to.

01:05:46.377 --> 01:05:48.880
(OUTRO): [OUTRO MUSIC] A big thank-you to Jim Browning for coming on the show and telling us

01:05:48.880 --> 01:05:53.360
all about the scambaiting he’s been doing. You can watch all his videos on YouTube by just searching

01:05:53.360 --> 01:05:58.720
for Jim Browning. This episode was created by me, the fickle finger, Jack Rhysider, and this episode

01:05:58.720 --> 01:06:02.680
was edited by the wisdom feather, Tristan Ledger, mixing done by Proximity Sound, and

01:06:02.680 --> 01:06:07.120
our theme music is by the mysterious Breakmaster Cylinder. Someone asked me the other day, what’s

01:06:07.120 --> 01:06:19.880
an Ethernet? I said, oh, that’s what you use to catch the Ether Bunny. This is Darknet Diaries.
